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cial and harmful. Moreover, some of these mechanisms tend to set in fast while
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to study how changes in inequality a¤ect economic growth over di¤erent time hori-
zons; (ii) empirically investigates the inequality-growth relationship, thereby relying
on specications derived from the theory. Our empirical ndings are in line with
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, theoretical work has come up with a substantial number of
channels through which inequality may a¤ect economic growth. These contributions have
made clear that the impact of inequality on growth is rather complex: Higher inequality
may have positive as well as negative consequences for economic performance; moreover,
some of these consequences tend to materialize quickly (short-term e¤ects) while others are
likely to a¤ect growth only in the medium or long run (lagged e¤ects). This ambiguity is
also mirrored in the substantial empirical literature which nds both signicantly positive
and negative e¤ects and sometimes no e¤ects at all.1
This paper takes a fresh look at the inequality-growth relationship, both from a theo-
retical and an empirical perspective. There are two basic contributions. First, the paper
introduces a parsimonious theoretical model of inequality and growth that allows for posi-
tive as well as negative e¤ects of inequality. The model builds on the observation that the
positive e¤ects are mostly short-term e¤ects while the negative consequences tend to set in
with a lag. Our theoretical framework is highly tractable and allows us to systematically
explore how changes in inequality may a¤ect economic performance at di¤erent moments
in the future. Second, guided by our theoretical framework, we empirically investigate the
inequality-growth relationship, relying on a more comprehensive inequality dataset that
covers up to 106 countries over a period from 1965 to 2005.
Our model is designed to capture an interesting pattern in the theoretical literature
on inequality and growth. As mentioned above, it appears that the growth-enhancing
e¤ects of inequality tend to set in quickly while the negative channels are rather slow. To
see this, consider some of the main theoretical channels. On the one hand, inequality is
said to promote growth by fostering aggregate saving (Kuznets, 1955; Kaldor, 1955); by
promoting the realization of high-return projects (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993); or
by stimulating R&D (Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2006). On the other hand, inequality is
1Estimates based on time-series variation only (e.g., those in Li and Zou, 1998; Forbes, 2000) are
often positive. Estimates which also or exclusively rely on cross-sectional variation tend to be negative,
however. Examples include Barros (2000) random-e¤ects approach or earlier cross-country OLS studies
(e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Deininger and Squire, 1998).
Using di¤erent estimation methods, Banerjee and Duo (2003) nd that changes in inequality (both
positive as well as negative ones) are associated with lower growth rates in the subsequent period.
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expected to hamper growth by promoting expensive scal policies (Perotti, 1993; Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994); by inducing an ine¢ cient state bureau-
cracy (Acemoglu et al., 2011); by hampering human capital formation (Galor and Zeira,
1993; Galor and Moav, 2004); by leading to political instability (Bénabou, 1996); or by
undermining the legal system (Glaeser et al., 2003). Most of the positive e¤ects (e.g.,
those operating through convex saving functions, market imperfections, or incentives for
innovation) rely on purely economic mechanisms. It is therefore plausible to assume that
they materialize in the short term. Most of the negative e¤ects, however, involve the
political process, the change of institutions, the rise of socio-political movements, or they
operate through changes in the educational attainment of the population. Thus, arguably,
these e¤ects materialize only with a considerable lag.
Our empirical ndings are consistent with this basic pattern in the theoretical litera-
ture. We nd that the short-term e¤ect of inequality on economic performance is positive
while the lagged e¤ect is negative. More precisely, our core results suggest that an increase
in inequality has a positive impact on the average growth rate of real GDP per capita
in the subsequent ve-year period. On the other hand, we nd that such an increase
reduces the average growth rate in the ve-year period following the initial one. More-
over, the lagged e¤ect tends to be more important quantitatively so that the long-run
e¤ect of higher inequality tends to be negative. So, overall, our analysis echoes ndings
in the more recent literature using panel data (e.g., Forbes, 2000, who nds a positive
short-term e¤ect) as well as earlier cross-country regression results (e.g., those in Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994, who nd a negative long-run e¤ect).
We rely on a sample that spans eight ve-year periods (from 1965 to 2005) and includes
up to 106 countries. The primary source of the income inequality data is the widely-
used Deininger and Squire (1996), henceforth DS, dataset.2 The secondary source, to
which we resort whenever a suitable DS observation is not available, is the UNU-WIDER
(2008)World Income Inequality Database (WIID2c). We construct two alternative income
inequality time series. The rst one uses only quality-1WIID observations to amend
2The Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset is used in all of the more recent contributions mentioned in
Footnote 1 (i.e., Deininger and Squire, 1998; Li and Zou, 1998; Barro, 2000; and Forbes, 2000).
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the DS data while the second one relies on quality-1 and, secondarily, quality-2
WIID observations. The advantage of the second series is that the number of missing
observations is substantially lower (while a less precise measurement of inequality might
be a drawback). It turns out, however, that the basic empirical ndings are largely
una¤ected by the choice of the inequality time series.
Our main estimator is the System GMM estimator pioneered by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). An important advantage of this estimator (over the
related rst-di¤erence GMM estimator) is that it also exploits the cross-sectional variation
in the data which accounts for a large share of the total variation.3 The System GMM
estimator has a one- and a two-step variant, both of which are used in practice. We also
apply both alternatives and report the associated results.
To scrutinize our empirical analysis further, we experiment with di¤erent specica-
tions and growth spells of di¤erent length (i.e., ten-year instead of ve-year spells). We
nd that these additional estimation results corroborate the basic empirical pattern out-
lined above. Finally, we estimate some of the core specications using the rst-di¤erence
estimator as this estimator requires a less restrictive set of assumptions. Yet, perhaps
unsurprisingly in the light of the above discussion, the estimated impact of inequality is
no longer statistically signicant. However, in qualitative terms, some of the results are
in line with those based on the preferred System GMM estimator.
The present paper is part of a small literature that tries to get a better grasp of
the empirical picture with respect to the inequality-growth relationship. Earlier con-
tributions include Banerjee and Duo (2003), Voitchovsky (2005), and Castelló-Climent
(2010). The rst-mentioned paper presents evidence suggesting that changes in inequality
(in any direction) are associated with reduced growth in the short run; as a result, the
standard regression equation might be mis-specied in a way that misleadingly makes
di¤erences-based estimators indicate a positive relationship. Voitchovsky (2005), by con-
trast, argues that inequality coming from the top end of the income distribution is indeed
likely to promote economic growth while bottom-end inequality tends to be harmful. She
3Moreover, if the number of time series observations is small and the variables are highly persistent
(as is the case here), the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator has been shown to do worse in terms of biases
and imprecision than the System GMM estimator (see Blundell and Bond, 1998).
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therefore suggests controlling separately for inequality coming from di¤erent parts of the
distribution (and nds supportive evidence in a panel of rich countries). Finally, in line
with Barro (2000), Castelló-Climent (2010) argues that the consequences of inequality
may be di¤erent for poor and rich countries (and indeed nds a positive impact in the
subset of the richest economies but a negative one in the large group of less a­ uent
countries). None of these papers, however, deals specically with the time dimension.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey reviews theo-
retical arguments and, based on this review, introduces a simple model of inequality and
growth. In Section 3, we present the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 Short-Term vs. Lagged E¤ects of Inequality
The present section reviews theoretical channels through which inequality may a¤ect
economic growth, thereby highlighting that the positive e¤ects tend to set in fast while
the negative ones are rather slow. We then introduce a simple model that summarizes the
main insights from the review in a concise way. The model will also be helpful in guiding
the empirical analysis in the following section.
2.1 A Brief Review of Theoretical Arguments
Asset or income inequality a¤ects economic performance through many channels, and the-
oretical work discusses both negative and positive e¤ects. Yet, as the following overview
shows, there seems to be a clear pattern in the literature: The positive e¤ects of inequality
tend to rely on purely economic mechanisms and should therefore be expected to set in
fast. The negative e¤ects, on the other hand, often involve political-economy arguments.
As a result, they may need more time to materialize.
As to the positive channels, the literature has long argued that saving functions tend to
be convex in wealth (see, e.g., Kuznets, 1955; Kaldor, 1955). So, other things equal, higher
asset inequality is associated with higher aggregate saving and thus faster convergence
to the balanced growth path. More recently, the focus has been on the impact of asset
inequality on the selection of investment projects (see, e.g., Matsuyama, 2000, in particular
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Section 4). The main argument here is that, if the nancial system is imperfect, access
to external nance depends on personal wealth. As a result, if wealth is widely spread
among the population, nobody may be able to raise su¢ cient funds to realize high-return
projects which require large investments. In this case, a more concentrated distribution
of productive assets may put at least a limited number of entrepreneurs into a position
to realize such projects and thus boosts growth.4 This e¤ect is reinforced by the fact
that the high-return projects are often the more risky ones (see, e.g., Rosenzweig and
Binswanger, 1993). As a result, with a relatively equal wealth distribution, the number
of entrepreneurs who are su¢ ciently rich to absorb signicant risks may be very small.
So, once again, a more concentrated distribution of wealth may multiply the number of
high-return projects realized. Finally, the literature also discusses positive demand-side
e¤ects. With a more unequal income distribution, a larger fraction of total demand falls
on high-endproducts (as opposed to goods satisfying basic needs). Thus, innovators
benet from larger home markets which more easily support the investments required to
develop novel or better varieties (see, e.g., Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2006).5
While working through di¤erent channels, these positive e¤ects of inequality have one
thing in common: They emphasize purely economic mechanisms so that it is plausible to
assume that they materialize relatively fast. This is not true for the negative channels.
Most of them rely on political-economy arguments. For instance, it has been pointed
out that more unequal societies tend to have higher levels of redistribution and hence
higher levels of taxation;6 higher taxes, in turn, are thought to weaken the incentives to
save and invest (see, e.g., Perotti, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini,
1994). A related argument focuses on the composition of government expenditures. With
4It has also been argued that, with convex technologies and nancial markets imperfections, higher
inequality worsens economic performance because investment returns are more heterogeneous. However,
as shown by Foellmi and Oechslin (2008), this is by no means a robust theoretical prediction.
5The large-scale investment channel as well as the demand-side channel may be of di¤erent relevance
in low and high-income countries, reecting di¤erences in the severity of nancial frictions (more severe
in low-income countries) and the importance of R&D (more important in high-income countries).
6The empirical picture is mixed. Earlier papers (e.g., Perotti, 1996) nd little evidence of a systematic
association between the distribution of the disposable income and scal variables. Milanovic (2000), on
the other hand, documents a strong positive link between factor-income inequality and the extent of
redistribution towards the poor. Interestingly, however, the middle class does not appear to be a net
beneciary of such redistribution, a nding that casts doubt on the relevance of the median voter channel.
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higher asset inequality, the decisive voter supplies fewer production factors (i.e., physical
or human capital). As a result, he may strongly prefer direct transfers over productive in-
vestments in public goods (e.g., productivity-enhancing spending on the countrys physical
infrastructure or the contract-enforcement bureaucracy). Finally, even if the rich segment
of society holds political power, inequality may still have a negative impact through the
scal policy channel. As highlighted by Acemoglu et al. (2011), if inequality is high, an
oligarchic government may set up (or fail to reform) an ine¢ cient bureaucracy to avoid
high taxation once the country is transformed into a democracy.7
Yet, through these harmful channels, changes in inequality should not be expected
to have an immediate e¤ect. Arguably, it takes time for shifts in policy preferences to
be reected in similar changes within the legislative body. Moreover, even with a fresh
legislature in place, altering tax laws (or changing the bureaucracy) is time consuming.
Further negative e¤ects are also unlikely to materialize quickly. If higher inequality re-
duces spending on education (see, e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Moav, 2004),
it may take a decade for the e¤ects to be felt. Similarly, it may be a long time before
disa¤ection caused by higher inequality leads to the formation of social movements which
then may threaten political stability (see, e.g., Bénabou, 1996) or before higher inequality
has undermined the security of property rights (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2003).
2.2 A Parsimonious Theoretical Model
We now introduce a tractable inter-temporal model of asset inequality and economic
performance that reects key aspects of the above review. The model includes both a
positive short-term e¤ect (i.e., an economic channel) and a negative lagged e¤ect (i.e.,
a political-economy channel) of asset inequality. We then proceed by showing how this
theoretical framework, which allows for a non-monotonic adjustment path of output,
leads to a linear empirical model of income inequality and economic growth that is closely
related to the empirical models commonly estimated in the literature.
7More generally, based on the experience of the colonization of the New World, Sokolo¤ and Engerman
(2000) argue that huge wealth inequalities may promote institutions that protect the privileges of the elites
and restrict opportunities for the broad masses with adverse consequences for economic development.
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2.2.1 Assumptions
Agents, preferences, and endowments. We focus on an innite-horizon economy
that is populated by a continuum 1 of risk-neutral individuals with discount factor  < 1.
All individuals derive utility from consumption of a single (non-storable) output good.
The preferences are represented by the intertemporal utility function
Ut = Et
( 1X
s=0
sct+s
)
; (1)
where ct denotes consumption in period t and Et is the expectations operator (conditional
on information available in t). Individuals di¤er regarding their endowment with the
productive asset (which we may interpret as capital, for instance). A fraction  > 1=2
of the population (the poor, P ) is endowed with !P (Dt) < 1 units of this asset, where 1
is the average endowment in the economy. The endowment of the remaining agents (the
rich, R) is given by !R(Dt) = (1  !P (Dt))=(1  ) > 1:
The state variable Dt 2 fL;Hg represents the degree of inequality in the economy,
where L stands for a lowdegree so that !P (L) > !P (H). At the beginning of each
period, asset inequality may change exogenously. In particular, we have Dt = Dt 1 with
probability  > 1=2 and Dt 6= Dt 1 with the complementary probability 1   : Thus, a
high value of  mirrors strong persistence in inequality.
In practice, many factors may drive changes in the distributions of productive assets
(i.e., physical or human capital). A sudden change to the distribution of physical capital,
as can happen here, could be the result of a political event or constellation that allows
one group to take over part of the assets of the other one.
Technologies and aggregate output. All individuals have access to a simple tech-
nology that uses the productive asset (i.e., physical capital) as an input factor. Following
much of the literature on the role of capital market imperfections, this technology is char-
acterized by a non-convexity. In particular, its productivity is relatively low if the use of
the productive asset is below a critical threshold, denoted by !c. In formal terms, the
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technology is characterized by the production function
q(!;Gt) =
8<: al!X(Gt) : ! < !cah!X(Gt) : !  !c ; al < ah; (2)
where q is output and X(Gt) stands for the level of the public good (e.g., the quality
of the physical infrastructure or the contract-enforcement bureaucracy) provided by the
government. The state variable Gt 2 f0; 1g reects whether in the previous period the
government has invested in the public good, with 1 indicating investment. As a result,
we have X(1) X(0)  4X > 0:
To introduce a positive short-term e¤ect of inequality, we make two assumptions.
First, we assume that the endowment of the rich individuals allows them to achieve the
high productivity level. The endowment of the poor agents, on the other hand, falls short
of the critical threshold, !c (even if Dt = L). In formal terms, we impose
!P (Dt) < !
c  !R(Dt):
Second, we consider an environment with frictions in the nancial system. In particular,
to keep matters tractable, we assume that the productive asset cannot be traded (i.e.,
bought or borrowed) in the nancial markets.8 Together, these two assumptions imply
that the poor agents run rmsproducing al!P (Dt)X(Gt) units of the nal good while
the rms run by the rich entrepreneurs generate ah!R(Dt)X(Gt) units. As a result, the
aggregate (private-sector) output is given by
Y (Dt; Gt) =
 
ah   (ah   al)!P (Dt)

X(Gt): (3)
Note that the aggregate output is below its rst-best level (which is equal to ahX(Gt)).
The reason is that a positive fraction of the total stock of the productive asset is used in
rms which have a low average productivity.
8The existence of a positive short-term e¤ect of inequality does not require the absence of nancial
markets. In combination with technology (2), a simple imperfection (such as unreliable ex-post contract
enforcement) is su¢ cient to imply that (i) not the entire supply of resources is used in the most productive
way; (ii) higher inequality may mitigate resource misallocation (see, e.g, Matsuyama, 2000, Section 4).
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Looking at equation (3), one immediately observes that the aggregate output is greater
in the state of high-inequality (Dt = H) than in the state of low-inequality (Dt = L),
holding constant the supply of the public good. This is the result of the positive short-term
e¤ect of asset inequality: Higher inequality means that a larger share of the productive
asset is used in rms which produce at an e¢ cient scale.9 Moreover, holding constant
inequality, the aggregate output is increasing in the supply of the public good. It is thus
clear that Y (H; 1) and Y (L; 0) represent, respectively, the highest and lowest possible
output levels. But how does Y (L; 1) compare to Y (H; 0)? It is straightforward to verify
that the former exceeds the latter if
X(1) X(0)
X(1)!P (L) X(0)!P (H) > 
ah   al
ah
; (R1)
i.e., if the productivity gap between small and large rms is not too big. As will become
clear below, the long-run e¤ect of inequality may be negative if (R1) holds.
Public sector. Turning to the public sector, we assume that the government has access
to an income stream of Z units of the nal good. We can think of this income as arising
from a publicly owned enterprise, the natural resource sector, etc. Regarding public
spending, the government has to set Gt+1 2 f0; 1g in each period t. A decision to invest is
associated with a contemporaneous cost of F < Z units of the nal good. The resulting
budget surplus, Z  Gt+1F , is distributed to the population in a lump-sum manner.
Finally, we assume that the government has no choice but to implement the level of
Gt+1 preferred by the majority of the population. Since the poor represent more than
half of the population, the choice of Gt+1 will reect the preferences of the representative
poor individual. When individuals choose expenditure, Dt is common knowledge.
9Note that the short-term e¤ect of inequality would be negative if the endowment of the poor were
greater than !c in the state of low inequality but less than !c if Dt = H (as discussed in the inuential
paper by Galor and Zeira, 1993, which started the literature on the impact of inequality in presence of
nancial frictions and indivisibilities in human capital investments). However, our short-term channel is
not meant to capture the (long-run) e¤ect of inequality on human capital accumulation. Rather, it is
meant to reect that in presence of nancial frictions higher wealth inequality may quickly increase the
stock of physical capital invested in large high-return investment projects (as discussed in Section 2.1).
In this context, assuming !P (L) < !c seems natural.
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2.2.2 Analysis
We now describe the equilibrium pattern of public investment and discuss how changes
in asset inequality a¤ect the aggregate output over di¤erent time horizons.
In order to derive the equilibrium pattern of public investment, we have to introduce
some notation. Denote by V i(Dt; Gt) the value function associated with the intertemporal
utility function (1) for a representative member of group i 2 fP;Rg; where Dt and Gt
are the two state variables. So, when thinking about the preferred level of the public
good tomorrow, the representative poor individual (i.e., the decisive agent) has to solve
a recursive problem of the form
V P (Dt; Gt) = max
Gt+12f0;1g

al!P (Dt)X(Gt) + Z  Gt+1F + Et

V P (Dt+1; Gt+1)
		
: (4)
A solution to this problem is a policy function Gt+1 = GP (Dt; Gt) which gives tomorrows
level of the public good, Gt+1; as a function of the two state variables. The following
proposition characterizes this policy function.
Proposition 1 The politico-economic equilibrium shows uctuations in the provision of
the public good, with a positive level of investment in times of low inequality (i.e., Gt+1 =
GP (L;Gt) = 1) and no investment in times of high inequality (i.e., Gt+1 = GP (H;Gt) =
0); if the following condition holds:
4X
F
al
 
!P (L) + (1  )!P (H)  1

>
4X
F
al
 
!P (H) + (1  )!P (L) : (R2)
Otherwise, the public good is always provided (if 1= is less than the last expression in
R2) or never provided (if 1= is greater than the rst expression in R2).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, when condition (R2) holds, the poor prefer direct transfers over public
investment if inequality is high. High inequality means that the poor can gain little from
the public good since they own only a small fraction of the productive asset. In the case of
low inequality, however, this gain is su¢ ciently strong to make the poor prefer investment
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over higher lump-sum transfers. On the other hand, if condition (R2) is violated, the
gain from public investment is such that the poor either consistently favor, or oppose, the
provision of the public good. As a result, the public good is always or never provided.
As the following corollary highlights, the link between asset inequality and aggregate
output is most involved if condition (R2) is satised. Under these circumstances, the
direction of the impact of inequality in the short term di¤ers from that in the long run,
implying a non-monotonic adjustment path of the aggregate output.
Corollary 1 Suppose that condition (R2) holds. Moreover, assume that inequality changes
in period t (but did not change in the preceding period and will not change in the following
one). Then, the aggregate output responds as follows:
 A rise in inequality causes rst an increase in aggregate output (Yt = Y (H; 1)  
Y (L; 1) > 0) and then a decline (Yt+1 = Y (H; 0)   Y (H; 1) < 0). The long-run
(or total) e¤ect, Yt + Yt+1, is negative if and only if condition (R1) holds.
 A fall in inequality causes rst a decline in aggregate output (Yt = Y (L; 0)  
Y (H; 0) < 0) and then an increase (Yt+1 = Y (L; 1)  Y (L; 0) > 0). The long-run
(or total) e¤ect, Yt + Yt+1, is positive if and only if condition (R1) holds.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is that the level of the public good is a state variable
and hence cannot change quickly. An increase in inequality therefore has no immediate
impact on the level of the public good but improves the allocation of the productive
asset. As a result, the aggregate output must rise in the short term. However, after a
while, higher inequality undermines the supply of the public good so that all rms become
less productive. In response, the aggregate output falls, possibly below its initial level.
Figure 1 illustrates the rst part of Corollary 1, assuming that (R1) holds.
Figure 1 here
Note, nally, that the link between inequality and output is simpler if condition (R2)
is violated. Then, the supply of the public good is constant over time so that a rise in
inequality is always associated with an increase in output (and vice versa).
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2.2.3 Linking Theory and Evidence
We now transform the theoretical framework developed above into a linear model of in-
come inequality and economic growth that is closely related, but not identical, to the
empirical models commonly estimated in the inequality-growth literature. The transfor-
mation involves three steps: Linearizing the model, linking asset to income inequality,
and linking income inequality to output growth.
Linearizing the model. In order to linearize the model, we impose !P (Dt) = 1 Dt
so that Dt 2 fL;Hg is the di¤erence between the average endowment and the endowment
of the poor. Moreover, throughout, it is assumed that condition (R2) holds (Footnote 10
discusses how the results would change if R2 were violated).
We start by taking logs on both sides of equation (3). After rearranging terms, we get
yt  lnYt = ln

1  a
h   al
ah
!P (Dt)

+ ln

X(Gt)
X(0)

+ ln ah + lnX(0): (5)
Note that Gt is a choice variable that takes on the value 1 if Dt 1 = L and 0 if Dt 1 = H.
So X(Gt) can be written as X(0)+ 4X(H  Dt 1)=(H   L): Using this result, and the
fact that !P (Dt) = 1 Dt; in equation (5), we obtain
yt = ln

1  a
h   al
ah
(1 Dt)

+ ln

1 +
4X
X(0)
H  Dt 1
H   L

+ ln ah + lnX(0):
Obviously, yt is a non-linear function of the asset inequality indicators Dt and Dt 1:
However, provided that the ratios (ah   al)=ah and 4X=X(0) are not too big, yt can be
closely approximated by a linear function. In particular,
yt ' 1Dt + 2Dt 1 + ; (6)
where 1  (ah al)=ah, 2   4X=(X(0)(H L)); and  includes all constant terms.10
Note that 1 > 0 captures the positive short-term e¤ect of inequality while 2 < 0 mirrors
10If condition (R2) were violated, there would never be a change in the level of the public good. As a
result, 2 would be equal zero (while 1 would be unchanged).
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the negative lagged e¤ect. As in the non-linear version of the model, the sign of the
long-run e¤ect of inequality, 1 + 2, is negative if condition (R1) holds.
Linking asset to income inequality. Our theoretical framework includes two chan-
nels through which asset inequality (i.e., inequality in the distribution of capital) a¤ects
economic performance. Yet, empirical models of inequality and growth, including the
one estimated in Section 3 below, usually rely on measures of income inequality, mostly
because of data availability reasons.11 In our framework, the two concepts are closely
related, however. Consider the income inequality measure
Dyt =
Y (Dt; Gt)  al!P (Dt)X(Gt)
Y (Dt; Gt)
;
which gives the (relative) di¤erence between the average income and the income of the
poor (and hence is the equivalent of the asset inequality measureDt). Using the functional
form of Y given in equation (3), and the fact that !P (Dt) = 1 Dt, this income inequality
measure can be approximated by an a¢ ne linear function of Dt:12
Dyt '
ah   al
ah
+
al
ah
Dt: (7)
The structure of equation (7) reects that income inequality is driven by two di¤erent
factors: The rich individuals are wealthier (i.e., Dt > 0) and also earn a higher return on
their wealth (which is mirrored in the constant term on the right-hand side of 7).
Expression (7) enables us to relate the current level of log output, yt; to the current
and past levels of income inequality (reecting current and past levels of asset inequality).
11There are some important exceptions, however. Deininger and Squire (1998), for instance, explore
the impact of land inequality (i.e., a specic form of asset inequality) on growth; similarly, Castelló-
Climent and Doménech (2002) investigate how human capital inequality a¤ects subsequent growth rates.
More recently, by simultaneously including measures of the distributions of human capital and income,
Castelló-Climent (2010) explores whether asset and income inequality have di¤erent e¤ects on growth.
12It is straightforward to check that this approximation relies on the fact that the product of the three
shares (ah   al)=ah; , and !P is close to zero. In practice, it is clear that factors unrelated to the asset
distribution may a¤ect Dyt , which could be mirrored in expression (7) through an additional additive
term (constant or variable). Obviously, the higher the variability of this term (relative to the variability
of Dt), the lower is the quality of D
y
t as a proxy for Dt in an empirical setting.
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By solving (7) for Dt and using the result in equation (6), we obtain
yt ' 1Dyt + 2Dyt 1 + ; (8)
where 1  1(ah=al) > 0, 2  2(ah=al) < 0; and  includes all constant terms. Note,
nally, that there is a simple linear relationship between Dyt and the Gini coe¢ cient of
the income distribution: GINIyt ' Dyt .
Linking income inequality to output growth. Equation (8) expresses the level of
log output, yt, as a function of inequality. In the empirical growth literature, however,
it has been more common to estimate the impact of inequality on output growth (which
is approximated by yt   yt 1), controlling for yt 1. There are several ways to adapt
our framework in order to obtain such a standard specication. Following Aghion et al.
(1999), a natural possibility is to assume that current rm productivity is a¤ected by past
aggregate production activities due to a learning-by-doing externality. For concreteness,
suppose that production function (2) exhibits an additional multiplicative productivity
parameter At that does not depend on the use of the productive asset. Assume further
that At = (Yt 1); with  2 [0; 1): Then, the relationship between output growth and
inequality in the uctuations equilibriumis given by
yt   yt 1 ' yt 1 + 1Dyt + 2Dyt 1 + ; (9)
where     1 < 0.13 Note that (R1) implies 1 + 2 < 0. So, as above, the sign of the
long-run e¤ect of inequality is negative if condition (R1) holds.
Equation (9) is the basis for the empirical model that will be estimated in the following
section. The equation resembles the empirical models commonly used in the inequality-
growth literature. However, it implies that current as well as past inequality may a¤ect
growth, albeit with a di¤erent sign. Well-specied regression equations should therefore
simultaneously include indicators of both current and past levels of income inequality.
13It can be shown that condition (R2) continues to imply the emergence of the uctuations equilib-
rium(as described in Proposition 1), provided that the parameter  is not too large. Note that equation
(9) is equivalent to equation (8) if  = 0:
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Specication and Data
To estimate both the short-term and the lagged e¤ect of inequality, we transform equation
(9) into a ve-year panel data model. Specically, we estimate
yit   yit 1 = yit 1 + 0xit 1 + t + (i + vit); (10)
where i = 1;   ; N denotes a particular country and t = 1;   ; T is time (with t and
t   1 ve years apart).14 As in the previous section, y stands for the log of real GDP
per capita (p.c.) so that the left-hand side of (10) approximates a countrys ve-year
growth rate. On the right-hand side, we have (besides lagged GDP p.c.) a column vector
xit 1 consisting of variable country characteristics; a period-specic e¤ect t to capture
productivity changes common to all countries; a country-specic e¤ect i to capture time-
invariant and unobserved country characteristics; an idiosyncratic error term vit:
Consistent with our theoretical framework, the vector xit 1 usually contains two Gini
indices reecting income inequality (GINIy), the current one (which is measured at
t   1, i.e., at the beginning of the ve-year growth period considered) and the lagged
one (measured at t  2). Moreover, in line with the existing inequality-growth literature,
xit 1 sometimes includes up to three additional standard control variables. These addi-
tional variables are the average years of secondary schooling in the population aged over
25 (SCHOOL); the investment rate (INV_RATE), and the price level of investment
(PI), a variable that is meant to capture market distortions (due to, for instance, tari¤s,
government regulations, or corruption).15 In general, these variables are measured at the
beginning of each ve-year growth period (i.e., at t  1).
The analysis includes up to 106 countries and covers the period from 1965 to 2005 (i.e.,
14Five-year panel data models are often used in empirical studies on growth (see, e.g., Caselli et al.,
1996; Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000; Banerjee and Duo, 2003; Voitchovsky, 2005; Castelló-Climent, 2010).
15Next to ensuring comparability with existing studies, we too chose to include these standard regressors
because the Gini index could proxy for them if they were omitted. For instance, suppose that the
implementation of economic reforms jointly increases investment and inequality. If that were the case,
and if we did not control for the investment rate, we would run the risk that the estimated coe¢ cient on
the current Gini index is biased because it captures investment-driven increases in short-run growth.
16
eight ve-year periods). The time series on GDP p.c. (constant 2000 US$) and investment
rates (gross xed capital formation, % of GDP) are obtained from the World Development
Indicators. The education data come from Barro and Lee (2010) and the source of the
price level of investment is Heston et al. (2006; PWT 6.2). The Gini coe¢ cients come from
two di¤erent sources. The primary source is the standard Deininger and Squire (1996)
database. The secondary source, which allows us to broaden our sample considerably
both in the cross-sectional and the time-series dimension, is the UNU-WIDER (2008)
World Income Inequality Database (WIID2c). We resort to this latter source whenever
an accept-observation is not available from the Deininger-Squire dataset. Note that we
construct two alternative inequality time series. The series GINIy (Q1) includes only
highest-quality (i.e., quality-1) WIID observations while GINIy (Q12) includes quality-1
and, secondarily, quality-2 WIID observations (and hence shows a lower number of missing
observations).
Tables 1 and 2 here
Table 1 presents a list of the 106 countries that are included in our analysis. Summary
statistics for this sample are provided in Table 2. At the end of the table, we also describe
how our inequality dataset has been constructed and how some pitfalls associated with
the use of secondary datasets (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001) have been addressed.
3.2 Estimation
It is well known that the standard panel data methods (i.e., within-groups [WG] and
random-e¤ects [RE] estimations) are unlikely to provide consistent estimates of  and 
(see, e.g., Bond et al., 2001). In the study of economic growth, a problem emerges when
we see that model (10) can be rewritten as
yit = ( + 1)yit 1 + 
0xit 1 + t + (i + vit): (11)
Equation (11) highlights that controlling for convergence in a panel data growth model
introduces a lagged dependent variable. As a result, both the RE and the WG estimator
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would be very likely to give inconsistent estimates of the parameters  and  when the
number of time periods is small.16
To deal with these problems, the literature has developed specic GMM estimation
techniques, most notably the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator and the System GMM es-
timator. The rst-di¤erence GMM estimator, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
eliminates the country-specic e¤ect by di¤erencing model (11), while using su¢ ciently
lagged values of y and x as instruments (which are valid provided that the error term
vit is not serially correlated). However, even though the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator
solvesthe problems of unobserved heterogeneity and lagged dependent variables, its ap-
plication in the present context may be problematic because variables like within-country
inequality or educational attainment are quite persistent (but vary substantially across
countries). More specically, the concern is that a high degree of persistence in these time
series may lead to weak instruments and give rise to large biases and imprecision (see,
e.g., Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond et al., 2001).17
The empirical analysis below therefore mainly relies on the System GMM estimator
pioneered by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). While requiring
a more stringent set of restrictions, the System GMM procedure is likely to do better in
terms of e¢ ciency in the present setting. The reason is that it relies on an additional set
of moment conditions based on the level equation (using suitably lagged di¤erences as
instruments) and hence also exploits the cross-country variation.
In the context of a basic growth regression, these additional moment conditions are
valid if the Blundell-Bond (1998, p. 124) requirement is satised. This requirement says
that the countriesinitial deviations (i.e., the deviations when the empirical study starts)
from their steady states must be uncorrelated with the country-specic xed e¤ects. If
there are further explanatory variables, as is the case in the present study, an additional
requirement is that the di¤erences of these explanatory variables are uncorrelated with
the country xed e¤ect (Blundell-Bond, 1998, p. 136). To detect possible violations of
16The problem with the RE estimator is that i and yit 1 are correlated by construction; WG does
not work because the transformed error term will be correlated with the transformation of yit 1.
17More recently, relying on Monte Carlo simulations, Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) have demonstrated
that these biases can be greatly exacerbated in presence of measurement error.
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these requirements, we regularly apply di¤erence-in-Hansen tests to the instruments for
the level equation as a group (as suggested by Roodman, 2009).
To explicitly state the moment conditions used in the GMM estimations below, we
introduce the vector W0it = [yit x
0
it]: The moment conditions considered based on the
regression equation (10) in rst di¤erences are given by
E f(vit   vit 1)Wit 2g = 0 for t  3;
which means that the set of instruments is restricted to lag 2 of output and the other
explanatory variables. We introduce this restriction to avoid the problem of instrument
proliferation, a problem that has been shown to lead to severe biases and weakened
tests of instrument validity (see Roodman, 2009). Finally, when using System GMM, the
additional moment conditions based on the regression equation in levels are
E f(vit + i)(Wit 1  Wit 2)g = 0 for t  3;
i.e., they rely on the lagged rst di¤erences ofW as instruments.
Note, nally, that both the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator and the System GMM
estimator have one- and two-step variants. The two-step estimator is asymptotically more
e¢ cient, albeit the e¢ ciency gains are reported to be typically small (see, e.g., Bond et
al., 2001). Both alternatives are used in practice. We therefore also rely on both variants
when estimating our core specications. Whenever the two-step estimator is applied, the
Windmeijer (2005) correction is used to calculate the standard errors.
3.3 Results
Core estimation results. The main System GMM estimation results are shown in
Table 3. The table consists of two parts, columns (1) to (4) and (5) to (8). The estimates
in the rst four columns rely on the one-step estimator while the latter four columns are
based on the two-step variant. Consider rst columns (1) to (4). The rst and the second
column present results based on a regression equation that includes only the current Gini
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coe¢ cient (i.e., GINIy (Q1)t 1 in the rst column and GINIy (Q12)t 1 in the second
one), similar to the models estimated in the literature. According to the theory presented
in Section 2, these equations may be mis-specied because they omit the lagged Gini
coe¢ cient. In both columns, GINIy does not enter signicantly.
The picture changes, however, when the current and the lagged Gini coe¢ cient are
jointly included, which is done in the third and the fourth column (again using the di¤er-
ent inequality series GINIy (Q1) and GINIy (Q12), respectively). Consistent with the
discussion in Section 2, the current Gini coe¢ cient tends to have a positive impact on
the subsequent ve-year growth rate while the lagged coe¢ cient has a negative impact.
In column (3), both coe¢ cients are individually signicant while the current Gini is in-
signicant in the fourth column. They are jointly signicant in both columns, however,
as the reported p-values on the Wald tests for joint signicance suggest.
In quantitative terms, we nd that a rise in the Gini coe¢ cient by 10 points (which
is about the size of the overall standard deviation) leads to an increase in the subsequent
ve-year growth rate in the range of 1:4 to 3:2 percentage points. The lagged negative
e¤ect of inequality is quantitatively more important, however. The estimates suggest that
a 10-point increase in the Gini coe¢ cient decreases the ve-year growth rate in the period
starting in ve yearstime by 4:5 to 5:7 percentage points (implying 1 + 2 < 0).18 As a
result, the sign of the long-run e¤ect of inequality is negative.
Table 3 here
The validity of these estimates depends, among other things, on the absence of serial
correlation in the error term, vit: This means that the di¤erenced error terms should
not show second-order serial correlation (though they have a rst-order correlation by
construction unless the original error term has a unit root). The statistics M1 and M2
in Table 3 give the t-values associated with the tests for, respectively, rst-order and
second-order correlation in the 4vit series. As the numbers show, serial correlation does
18A rise in the Gini coe¢ cient by 3 points (which is about the size of the within-country standard
deviation) leads to a rise in the subsequent ve-year growth rate in the range of 0:42 to 0:97 percentage
points and to a fall in the following ve-year growth rate in the range of 1:35 to 1:71 percentage points.
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not appear to be an important concern. Similarly, focusing on the preferred specications
including both the current and the lagged Gini coe¢ cient (columns 3 and 4), the p-values
on the Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions indicate that the Null of joint validity
of all instruments cannot be rejected.19 A similar conclusion holds for the subset of
instruments used in the level equation. For the preferred specications, the p-values on
the di¤erence-in-Hansen tests are typically above 0:45.
The second part of Table 3, consisting of columns (5) to (8), shows the two-step System
GMM estimation results (with the specication in column 5 identical to that in column
1, and so on). Although statistical signicance tends to be slightly lower, the two-step
results conrm the ndings in the rst part of the table.
As discussed in Subsection 3.2, the results reported in Table 3 are obtained using a
strongly restricted set of instruments. When this set is expanded (e.g., by additionally
considering lag 3 of the explanatory variables), the results turn out to be very similar. The
point estimates of the short-term and lagged e¤ects of inequality change little while the
Wald tests imply even stronger joint signicance. We chose not to present these results
here, however, as the p-values on the Hansen tests are close to 1, potentially mirroring an
instrument-proliferation problem.20 Further sensitivity checks are provided below.
Robustness. To scrutinize the above ndings, the present subsection goes through a
number of additional estimation results. In particular, we estimate di¤erent specications;
consider ten-year growth spells (instead of ve-year spells); and use the rst-di¤erence
GMM estimator (instead of the System GMM estimator).
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 4 report results which come from alternative empir-
ical models, i.e., from specications that omit the controls for either human capital
(SCHOOL) or physical capital investment (INV_RATE), or both. Although capi-
tal is kept constant in our theoretical framework, inequality may also a¤ect economic
19The p-values for the specications that do not include the lagged Gini coe¢ cient (columns 1 and 2)
are substantially lower (0:19 and 0:23, respectively), which could be a sign of mis-specication.
20Note also that we ran additional regressions treating persistent explanatory variables like GINI and
SCHOOL as predetermined (rather than endogenous). The results are virtually unchanged (quantita-
tively and also in terms of statistical signicance) and so we chose not to report them here. We return
to this issue in greater detail when we discuss the rst-di¤erence GMM results below.
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performance through its possible e¤ects on human and physical capital accumulation (see
the discussion in Section 2.1). It is therefore interesting to explore whether and how
leaving out these variables changes the empirical picture.21 Comparing columns (1) to
(3) of Table 4 to column (4) in Table 3, we see that dropping the controls for human
capital or physical capital accumulation does not change the basic results. The ndings
are identical in qualitative terms and they are also quite similar in terms of economic and
statistical signicance. So, at least in the present empirical setup, we do not nd evidence
that inequality a¤ects economic performance through factor accumulation. Note, how-
ever, that the p-values on the Hansen tests are low, casting doubt on the validity of the
specications. It therefore appears that specications including controls for both human
and physical capital accumulation are preferable (see also Footnote 15).
Table 4 here
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 are based on a ten-year panel data model that includes
only one Gini coe¢ cient, capturing income inequality at the beginning of the ten-year
growth period considered (i.e., at t  1, where t and t  1 are ten years apart).22 Because
the ndings so far imply that inequality reduces growth over a ten-year horizon, it is
interesting to explore whether the coe¢ cient on GINIy (Q)t 1 turns negative in such an
alternative setup. We use the full set of control variables (as in Table 3) and report the
results for the two di¤erent inequality time series. In both cases, the estimates suggest
a signicant negative relationship between the Gini coe¢ cient and the subsequent ten-
year growth rate. Moreover, in the ten-year panel data model, inequality appears to
have a stronger negative e¤ect on the ten-year growth rate than in the standard setting.
While these results are consistent with the previous ones in qualitative terms, they should
nonetheless be interpreted with caution. Under the premise that an increase in inequality
has a positive short-term e¤ect and a negative lagged e¤ect, the ndings presented in
columns (4) and (5) are obtained using a mis-specied empirical model.
21To save space, we present only the one-step System GMM results based on the GINIy (Q12)-series.
The two-step results, no matter whether based on GINIy (Q1) or GINIy (Q12), are very similar.
22The ten-year growth spells are 1965-1975, 1975-1985, 1985-1995, 1995-2005. The set of instruments is
again restricted to lag 2 of W (di¤erenced equation) and the lagged rst di¤erence of W (level equation).
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Table 5, nally, shows estimation results based on the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator.
On the one hand, it is interesting to consider this alternative estimator as it requires
a less stringent set of assumptions (i.e., the Blundell-Bond requirement does not need
to hold). On the other hand, using the rst-di¤erence estimator may be problematic in
the present context because, as discussed in Section 3.2, a high degree of persistence in
some of the series may lead to weak-instrument problems (and to a strong sensitivity to
measurement error, as pointed out by, e.g., Barro, 2000; Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009). Note
further that the number of countries falls from 82 (Table 3, column 4) to 58 while the
number of observations decreases from 270 to 182. This fall in observations is related to
the fact that the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator requires a country to have at least three
consecutive inequality observations to be part of the sample. Relying on the standard
xtabond2 -command in Stata, this is not true for the System GMM estimator which uses
additional moment conditions based on the level equation. The basic reason is that
xtabond2 converts missing values in the instruments to zeros so that two consecutive
inequality observations are su¢ cient to be part of the sample.23
Table 5 here
To address the potential weak-instrument problem, we treat some of the explanatory
variables as predetermined rather than endogenous.24 Natural choices in this regard are
the Gini coe¢ cient (GINIy) and the stock of human capital (SCHOOL) because both of
these variables tend to be persistent. The three remaining left-hand side variables, yit 1,
INV_RATEit 1; and PIit 1; are likely or certain to correlate with the disturbance term,
23To see exactly why this approach of treating missing instruments implies that the two estimators
rely on di¤erent numbers of observations, consider the following example. Suppose that there are two
consecutive observations of the Gini coe¢ cent, Dit 1 and Dit 2, while Dit 3 is missing. Then, the
calculation of the error term in levels, (i+ vit); is feasible, whereas the di¤erence (Dit 2 Dit 3) in the
associated instrument vector (Wit 1  Wit 2) is missing. Yet, xtabond2 converts the missing instrument
value to zero and lets the observation stay in the System GMM regression. Consider now the error term
in rst di¤erences, (vit   vit 1). To calculate this di¤erence, Dit 3 is required. As a result, (vit   vit 1)
cannot be found and the observation drops out of the rst-di¤erence regression.
24A predetermined variable is uncorrelated with the present as well as all future realizations of the error
term. An endogenous variable may be correlated with the present realization (but is also uncorrelated with
all future ones). So suppose that ~xi is a vector of predetermined variables. Then, E f(vit   vit 1)~xit 1g ;
t  2; are valid moment conditions that are used by the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator.
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vit 1; and hence must be treated as endogenous.25
Column (1) of Table 5 sticks to the approach taken so far and treats all explanatory
variables as potentially endogenous; in column (2), GINIy is treated as the sole prede-
termined variable while in column (3) both GINIy and SCHOOL are considered to be
predetermined (columns 4-6 show the related two-step estimator results). Yet, irrespective
of the choice of predetermined variables, we do not nd signicant e¤ects of inequality.
Note, however, that the broad pattern in columns (1) to (3) matches the results in Table
3: The coe¢ cient on the current Gini index is positive while the lagged Gini enters nega-
tively. In general, though, the results based on the rst-di¤erence estimator are fragile 
which is not too surprising considering the potential weak-instrument problems and the
fact that a switch to the rst-di¤erence estimator means a loss of about one third of the
observations. It is also due to these facts that we view the System GMM estimates, which
are consistent and robust, as our prime results.
As noted above, the results reported in Tables 3-5 rely on di¤erent numbers of countries
and observations. Table B-1 in Appendix B (Online Resource 1) addresses this issue by
re-running some of the specications on alternative country sub-samples.
4 Conclusions
This paper o¤ers a new perspective on an important, yet still unresolved, topic that has
attracted a lot of attention over the past decades: The inequality-growth relationship. Our
argument is that higher inequality helps growth in the short term but may be harmful
over longer periods of time. A plausible explanation is that the positive and negative
e¤ects of inequality tend to cluster in a specic way: The growth-promoting e¤ects arise
from purely economic mechanisms (convex saving functions, capital market imperfections,
innovation incentives) and hence set in relatively fast. The growth-reducing e¤ects, on
the other hand, involve the political process, the change of institutions, the rise of socio-
25Note further that the investment rate is calculated as an average over the entire ve-year growth
period considered. If investment were measured at the beginning of the growth period (as is the case
when we use the System GMM estimator), the impact of INV_RATE would be negative, reecting
cyclical short-run uctuations that are captured in the time-series dimension of the dataset.
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political movements, or they operate through changes in the educational attainment of
the population. Arguably, these e¤ects materialize only with a substantial lag.
To make our basic argument in a concise way, we develop a parsimonious theoretical
model of inequality and growth that allows for such a reversal in the impact of inequality.
The model illustrates how output adjusts in a non-monotonic fashion if inequality has un-
even e¤ects over time and also guides the empirical analysis in the paper. Deviating from
approaches usually taken in the literature, our empirical specications include indicators
of current as well as lagged income inequality. It turns out that the empirical ndings
are largely supportive of the basic theoretical conjecture: A rise in inequality tends to
have a positive impact on the average growth rate of GDP p.c. in the ve-year period
that follows immediately (positive short-term e¤ect); on the other hand, such an increase
reduces the average growth rate in the ve-year period following the initial one (negative
lagged e¤ect). Moreover, the lagged e¤ect appears to be more important in quantitative
terms so that the long-run impact of higher inequality is negative. Consistent with these
ndings obtained in our baseline ve-year panel structure, the impact of inequality turns
negative when we switch to ten-year growth spells.
Thanks to the merger of two inequality databases (Deininger and Squire, 1996; UNU-
WIDER, 2008), our empirical ndings are based on a comparatively large dataset that
covers up to 106 countries over a period from 1965 to 2005. Moreover, the reported
results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks (e.g., relating to di¤erent variants of
the System GMM estimator; di¤erent empirical specications; di¤erent minimum quality
standards for the inequality measure). Yet, unfortunately, the still scant availability of
inequality data makes further sensitivity checks or the exploration of further interesting
questions di¢ cult. For instance, we would need longer inequality time series to experiment
in a meaningful way with di¤erent lags of the inequality indicator. Finally, a broader
country coverage would be very helpful if we wanted to assess whether the temporal
structure of the impact of inequality is di¤erent in poor and rich economies. At the
moment, we have to leave these questions to future research.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the proposition by showing that the proposed
policy functions are in fact solutions to the recursive problem (4), given that the relevant
parameter constellation holds. One way to do so is to establish that in any given period
t it is indeed optimal to stick to the proposed policy function, provided that this policy
function is applied in all future periods, t+ 1, t+ 2,   .
Suppose now rst that parameter constellation (R2) holds. Then, we have to establish
that irrespective of the value of Gt the representative poor agent nds it optimal to
choose (a) Gt+1 = 1 if Dt = L and (b) Gt+1 = 0 if Dt = H (again, provided that this rule
is invariably applied in the future). The formal condition for point (a) to hold is
V P (L;Gt) = a
l!P (L)X(Gt) + Z   F + 
 
V P (L; 1) + (1  )V P (H; 1)
 al!P (L)X(Gt) + Z + 
 
V P (L; 0) + (1  )V P (H; 0) ;
where the second line in the above expression gives the value if the decision is in favor of
the alternative choice, Gt+1 = 0: Rearranging terms yields the much simpler restriction

 
V P (L; 1)  V P (L; 0)+ (1  )  V P (H; 1)  V P (H; 0)  F=; (A-1)
which is indeed independent of Gt: Similarly, for point (b) to be true, we must have

 
V P (H; 1)  V P (H; 0)+ (1  )  V P (L; 1)  V P (L; 0) < F=; (A-2)
which is again independent of the current level of the public good, Gt:
To proceed, we have to nd explicit expressions for the di¤erences V P (L; 1) V P (L; 0)
and V P (H; 1) V P (H; 0) which show up in (A-1) and (A-2). Assuming that the proposed
policy function is applied in all (future) periods, the two di¤erences are given by
V P (D; 1)  V P (D; 0) = al!P (D) [X(1) X(0)] ;
30
with D 2 fL;Hg: Using this last expression in conditions (A-1) and (A-2) conrms that
points (a) and (b) indeed hold (given that parameter constellation R2 holds).
A corresponding approach can be chosen to verify the proposed policy functions under
the possible alternative parameter constellations. Note in this regard that there exist just
the two alternatives stated in the proposition since the rst expression in (R2) must be
strictly greater than the last one (as  > 1=2 and !P (L) > !P (H)).
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